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Prosthesis and the performance of beginnings in The Woman in the Moon 
In his seminal study, Prosthesis, David Wills finds ‘one type of beginning’ for prosthesis in 
a reference to this term in a marginal gloss that appears in Thomas Wilson’s The Art of 
Rhetorique (1553).1 At the time of Wills’ writing, this 1553 allusion to prosthesis was the 
first known use of the word in its earliest grammatical sense of ‘the addition of a letter or 
syllable to the beginning of a word’ (OED). Wills draws heavily on the ‘marginality’ of 
grammatical prosthesis in The Art of Rhetorique, noting that Wilson treats it as a 
dangerously foreign other that generates ‘illicit couplings’ between linguistic bodies, or 
‘the prostitution of language’.2 In particular, Wills interprets Wilson’s disdain for 
prosthesis as a dislike of artifice that, at root, reflects Reformation fears about idolatry 
and the difficulty of returning, via the destruction of images, ‘to a form of divine 
presence that preceded figural representation’.3 In this view, prosthesis is not just a 
rhetorical term, it is a figure that signifies any act of artificial construction and is thus a 
source of anxiety in a reformist view. Because Wills focuses so extensively on Wilson, 
this anxious response to prosthesis comes to stand, in Prosthesis, for sixteenth-century 
English Protestant thought on this figure more broadly. Moreover, Wilson’s anxieties 
about prosthesis as an artificial barrier to an unknowable divine destination seep into 
Wills’ broader, Derridean account of prosthesis as a ‘figure of inconsistency … hobbling 
uneasily towards some unknown that it knows it will never reach’.4 Significantly, 
however, Wilson’s concerns about prosthesis are the product of a specific historical 
context, in that this writer rose to prominence during the reign of Edward VI, a period 
characterised by ‘evangelical’ Protestantism and unprecedented levels of iconoclasm.5 
What sixteenth-century attitudes to prosthesis might we uncover by focusing on 
alternative examples from this period? And how might these alternatives shape our 
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contemporary responses to prosthesis? 
 This essay addresses these questions through discussion of a text from the latter 
part of the sixteenth century: John Lyly’s The Woman in the Moon. Although this play was 
first published in 1597, it is thought that Lyly may have written it for performance by 
Paul’s boys, a company of boy actors, in or before 1590.6 The drama is set in the fictional 
world of ‘Utopia’, and tells the story of the creation of a woman named Pandora by a 
female personification of Nature, whom Lyly figures as a sculptor.7 Lyly does not use the 
word ‘prosthesis’ in this play, but his depiction of divine creation contributes to a 
defence of the spiritual significance of prosthesis as an artificial performance of 
beginnings. In this way, Lyly’s play diverges significantly from the attitude to prosthesis 
that Wills attributes to early modern English Protestantism in his reading of Wilson. 
Where Wills contends that reformists are troubled by prosthesis as the sign of ‘the 
construction of the artificial within the origin itself’, The Woman in the Moon demonstrates 
that such prosthetic artifice plays a crucial role in earthly understanding of divine 
origins.8 Just as he does not refer to the term ‘prosthesis’, Lyly also does not address and 
critique Wilson directly, although it is likely that, as the grandson of the grammarian 
William Lily, the dramatist would have known The Art of Rhetorique, which went through 
several editions in the late sixteenth century.9 Instead, in The Woman in the Moon, Lyly 
refutes what might be loosely termed ‘anti-prosthetic’ discourse, to which Wilson 
contributes, and which in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries emerges 
especially in anti-theatrical and anti-cosmetic polemical writing.  
This discourse figures prosthesis as a mode of artificial construction equivalent to 
idolatry, in the early modern sense of ‘worship of the creature in place of the Creator’.10 
In this way, anti-prosthetic writers echo the attitude to prosthesis as an idolatrous other 
that Wills finds in his reading of Wilson. The anti-theatrical writer Stephen Gosson, for 
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example, attacks theatre as a prosthetic, false performance of self that contradicts the 
view that ‘euery man must show him selfe outwardly to be such as in deed he is’.11 
Gosson attacks players’ display of ‘outward signs’, which can include ‘words or gestures’, 
but also ‘the attyre … gesture’ and ‘passions’ of others; his primary objections here are to 
‘a boy’ presented as ‘a woman’, or to ‘a mean person’ who takes ‘the title of a Prince with 
counterfeit porte, and traine’.12 In Gosson’s view, these false, ‘outward signes’ corrupt 
the relationship between man and God, as they constitute a rejection of divinely-created 
being, and show ‘disdaine’ for  ‘the wisedome of our maker and the calling he has placed 
us in’.13 Similarly, the anti-cosmetic writer Thomas Tuke poses a series of rhetorical 
questions about face painting that frame women users of cosmetics as idolaters:  
What a contempt of God is this, to preferre the worke of thine owne finger to 
the worke of God? What impietie is it to goe about to haue that thought that 
Gods, which is thine owne? What iniustice to conceale his worke, and ostent 
thine owne, and indeed to spoile his with thine owne?14 
Tuke’s attack on cosmetics as artificial additions to divinely created bodies reflects the 
anxiety ‘that God’s workmanship is being altered’ by the use of such prostheses.15 As in 
Gosson’s attack on performance, and in the Protestant anxieties about prosthesis as a 
barrier to divine truth that Wills identifies, Tuke objects to prosthetic supplementation as 
a practice that idolatrously distorts our understanding of divine creation.  
 A further important feature of this anti-prosthetic discourse is the expression of 
the idolatry of prosthesis in terms of sexual transgression. This aspect of this discourse 
builds on the biblical equation between idolatry and adultery, and registers, for example, 
in the association between prosthesis and prostitution that Wills emphasises in his 
reading of Wilson.16 This association echoes in the works of Tuke, Gosson and other 
polemical writers from the period. For example, another of Tuke’s rhetorical questions 
asks whether face-painting is the ‘tricke of a wanton … to procure and tie the eies of 
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people to thee, or to gaine some vnfortunate seruant?’17 Similarly, Gosson concludes that 
just as ‘Playes are … the offrings of Idolatrie’ so they are the ‘the foode of iniquitie, ryot, 
and adulterie’.18 Writing on transvestism, meanwhile, Gosson describes the adoption of 
the ‘manifest signes of another sex’ as a mode of forgerie that adulterates the ‘word of 
God’.19 Similarly, Gosson’s fellow antitheatrical writer Phillip Stubbes claims that a man 
who cross-dresses will ‘adulterate the veritie of his owne kinde’.20 These complaints 
about the supposed moral and corporeal corruption that the adoption of artificial 
‘outward signs’ might cause are especially pertinent for The Woman in the Moon, which was 
most likely performed by boys wearing devices such as ‘prosthetic beards’ and cosmetics 
as they took the roles of adult male and female characters.21 Scholars have devoted 
significant attention to anti-theatrical and anti-cosmetic writing in studies of the 
‘prosthetic’ construction of identity, and especially gender identity, on the early modern 
stage.22 Building on these past studies, this essay takes these writings against 
performance, cosmetics and cross-dressing as examples of the anti-prosthetic discourse 
that Lyly refutes in The Woman in the Moon as part of his comic defence of prosthesis as 
divinely-sanctioned artificial construction.  
 Lyly lays the groundwork for his defence of prosthesis by presenting the creation 
of Pandora as an ambiguously prosthetic event. In this regard, the dramatist exploits the 
biblical and classical creation narratives that comprise his source material.23 For example, 
in the opening scene of the play, Nature agrees to make a woman for four Utopian 
shepherds who ‘bewail their want of female sex’ (1. 1. 50). This motivation for the 
making of Pandora draws on Genesis, in which God makes Eve because Adam finds 
that, in the Garden of Eden, ‘he had not a helpe mete for him’; a marginal gloss in the 
Geneva Bible adds that ‘mankinde’ became ‘perfitt, when woman was created’.24 To an 
extent Pandora and Eve are therefore made as prosthetic ‘additions’ to pre-existing male 
bodies, and are also prostheses in the later, eighteenth-century sense of a ‘replacement of 
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defective or absent parts of the body by artificial substitutes’ (OED).25 In both texts, the 
making of these women complicates their prosthetic status, although in different ways. 
Eve is neither ‘artificial’, nor a ‘replacement’ as such, as she is fashioned from Adam’s rib 
and so is also already a part of the body that she supplements.26 In The Woman in the 
Moon, meanwhile, Lyly diverges significantly from his biblical source in order to present 
Pandora’s creation as the product of a combination of organic, elemental processes and 
acts of artificial construction.  
 Lyly’s deviations from Genesis begin with the fact that Pandora is not ‘the 
secondary byproduct of a spare rib framed between her two male authority figures’, but 
starts life as a ‘lifeless image’ made and then animated by three female figures (1. 1. 57).27 
This animation takes place in Nature’s ‘shop’, with the assistance of personifications of 
Concord and Discord, whom we might think of as workshop apprentices (1. 1. 56SD-
57). Before bringing the new woman to life, Nature describes the making of Pandora as 
an elemental, organic process driven by divine foresight: 
When I arrayed this lifeless image thus, 
It was decreed in my deep providence 
To make it such as our Utopians crave, 
A mirror of the earth, and heaven’s despite. 
The matter first, when it was void of form, 
Was purest water, earth, and air, and fire; 
And when I shaped it in a matchless mould 
(Whereof the like was never seen before) 
It grew to this impression that you see, 
And wanteth nothing now but life and soul. 
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So, hold it fast, till with my quickening breath 
I kindle inward seeds of sense and mind. 
Now fire be turned to choler, air to blood, 
Water to humour purer than itself, 
And earth to flesh more clear than crystal rock. (1. 1. 57-72) 
This account of the making of Pandora combines allusions to natural and artificial 
processes in a manner that reflects orthodox accounts of divine creation and the 
constitution of natural bodies. The composition of the image from elemental matter 
reflects the theory ‘that the human body is made of four primary “humours” or fluids, 
corresponding to the four elements’.28 That Nature brings the image to life with 
‘quickening breath’ echoes God’s similar animation of Adam with the ‘breath of life’ in 
Genesis.29 Nature’s use of a ‘mould’ here invokes artificial construction, but this point of 
reference does not necessarily detract from the divinity of the process described. Moulds 
were used by early modern sculptors working in bronze, plaster, clay and wax; materials 
‘thought to retain the potency of the earth, the first divine creation’.30 Allusions to 
moulds also form part of a conventional early modern discourse in which God is figured 
as an artisan, as when Calvin states that to be renewed by God as a spiritual body at the 
general resurrection is to be ‘cast in a newe mould’.31 This figuring of divine creation also 
intersects with the early modern view that artifice is a product of nature, as in 
Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale (1611), where, defending horticultural grafting, the 
Bohemian king Polixenes states that ‘art itself is nature’.32 Famously, Shakespeare 
concludes this play with a scene in which a statue of a woman appears to come to life 
amidst assurances that this event is ‘lawful’ and unassisted by ‘wicked powers’.33 In 
contrast, Lyly begins his play with a depiction of the animation of the image of a woman 
that mingles allusions to artificial and natural, organic processes in a reflection of 
orthodox discourses on divine creativity.   
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 In an Elizabethan context, however, the circumstances of Pandora’s making 
complicate the extent to which Nature’s processes can be understood as ‘innocent’ 
reflections of conventional discourses on creation and the divinity of artifice. Here, Lyly 
draws on the myth of Pygmalion as told in Ovid’s Metamorphoses to present the making of 
Pandora as a provocatively prosthetic event, and to permit the introduction of ‘anti-
prosthetic’ views into the play. For Elizabethan viewers, the depiction of the animation 
of a sculpture of a woman in a sculptor’s workshop would recall the Ovidian story in 
which Pygmalion makes an ‘ivory’ statue of a woman as a replacement for ‘womenkind’, 
whose sinful behaviour he finds offensive.34 Infatuated with the statue, Pygmalion prays, 
successfully, for it to be animated.35 In an Elizabethan view, this myth tells of the 
ritualistic, lust-driven transformation of a prosthetic idol made as a replacement for living 
bodies. Texts from this period often associate Pygmalion with both idolatry and sexual 
transgression. For example, in The Metamorphosis of Pigmalions Image (1598), John Marston 
teases readers’ ‘lecherous’ expectation of explicit sexual detail while comparing 
Pygmalion’s devotion to his statue to the behaviour of ‘peeusih Papists’ who ‘kneele / 
To some dum Idoll’.36 Lyly plays on the erotic overtones of the Pygmalion myth in his 
depiction of Nature’s shop, which is described in a detailed stage direction. Here, 
Concord and Discord retrieve the image that becomes Pandora: 
They draw the curtains from before Natures shop, where stands an Image clad, and some 
unclad.  
They bring forth the clothed image.  
(1. 1. 56SD) 
In an earlier play, Campaspe (1584), Lyly presents a visual artist’s workshop as the scene of 
socially transgressive desire.37 Similarly, the array of ‘unclad’ images in Nature’s shop 
emphasises the correspondence between the creation of Pandora and the eroticised 
idolatry of the making of Pygmalion’s image. Given this setting, allusions to the use of a 
8 
 
Copyright © 2016 Chloe Porter    
‘mould’ to make Pandora refer to idolatrous modes of artificial construction as much as 
to conventional accounts of divine creation. Similarly, the spectacle of the animation of 
Pandora indicates dangerous ritual as much as it alludes to divine, organic coming-into-
being. Significantly, the theme of Pandora as an object of transgressive desire continues 
across the play. For example, Jupiter offers his ‘love’ to the new woman, prompting Juno 
to argue that his ‘lust but looks for strumpet stars below’ (2. 1. 35-57). Venus influences 
Pandora so as to make her be ‘amorous’ and banish ‘chastity and modest thoughts’, while 
the shepherds deceive one another in the fight for the newly-created woman’s attentions 
(3. 2. 2-16). Lyly’s use of the Pygmalion myth thus frames Pandora as an artificial, 
idolatrous figure who provokes sexual transgression and so reflects early modern 
anxieties about the ‘illicit’ implications of the artificial supplementation of natural 
bodies.38 
 An allusion to Ovid therefore signals the first instance in the play of the 
introduction of ‘anti-prosthetic’ voices that, as I will argue, the drama refutes. A further 
such instance is Lyly’s exploitation of Hesiod’s Pandora myth, which, to an extent, 
informs Nature’s account of the making of Pandora from elemental matter.39 In Hesiod’s 
myth, the gods supplement Pandora’s elemental body with divine attributes given as 
gifts. Zeus, for example, orders Minerva ‘to confer’ her own ‘Bewitchings’ on Pandora’s 
‘countenance’ and ‘Browe’, while ‘stuffing’ Pandora’s  ‘Breast, / With wild Desires, 
incapable of Rest’.40 Mercury, Pallas and Hermes also ‘confer’ their ‘seuerall gifts’ on 
Pandora, who is equipped, famously, with a ‘Box’ filled ‘With all the Gods plagues’.41 
Hesiod’s Pandora is therefore produced collaboratively by the gods as part of Zeus’s plan 
to take revenge on mankind and Prometheus following the latter’s theft of fire.42 In 
contrast, Lyly’s Pandora does not have the famous ‘box’: instead, her body is the 
instrument of chaos because it is a site of prosthetic supplementation, adorned with 
divine attributes that have not been given willingly by the planets. As Nature explains, 
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she has ‘robbed’ the planets and ‘endowed’ Pandora ‘with Saturn’s deep conceit’ and 
other properties including a ‘tongue more eloquent than Mercury’s’, as well as ‘Juno’s 
arms, /Aurora’s hands, and lovely Thetis’ foot’ (1. 1. 95-104). In Hesiod, the divine 
supplementation of Pandora’s body is designed as an attack on men; in Lyly’s play, 
Nature undertakes this theft of divine qualities and body parts in order to ‘darken’ the 
planets’ ‘prides’ (1. 1. 121). In this shift from ‘gifts’ intended to harm mankind to stolen 
properties intended to harm heavenly bodies, prosthetic supplementation becomes an act 
that undermines the integrity of divinity. Furthermore, given the divinity of earthly 
creation in early modern thought, this assault on the planets echoes what Wills identifies 
as the period’s fear that prosthesis ‘represents the monstrosity of interfering with the 
integrity of the human body’.43 Indeed, the effect of Nature’s desecration of the planets is 
the distortion of Pandora’s body, as it prompts Jupiter, Juno, Mars, Sol, Venus, Saturn, 
Mercury and Luna to ‘bend’ their ‘forces’ against the new woman in retaliation, 
‘corrupting … her purest blood’, making ‘war within’ her ‘breast’, bringing her to the 
brink of suicide, and prompting one shepherd to attempt to ‘kill’ her (1. 1. 134-45; 2. 1. 
178; 4. 1. 191SD; 5. 1. 256SD). Prosthesis is here the source of the corruption of 
heavenly and earthly bodies and the cause of cosmic discord.  
Significantly, the planets’ outraged comments on Pandora correspond with 
attacks by Wilson, Gosson, Stubbes and Tuke on prosthesis as an artificial, idolatrous 
other. The planets interpret Pandora’s body as a site of deceitful, idolatrous artificial 
construction. Jupiter, for example, declares Pandora ‘the saint that steals my Juno’s arms’ 
(1. 1. 113). For an Elizabethan audience, the statement that Pandora is a ‘saint’ who 
fraudulently bears the markings of a deity would register as an accusation that this 
character is an idolatrous false representation of the sort associated in the Protestant 
imagination with the use of images of the saints in Catholic worship.44 In this view, 
Pandora’s stolen attributes make her an artificial, false god that in turn defaces ‘true’ 
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heavenly bodies. Elsewhere, Juno calls the newly created woman a ‘shameless 
counterfeit’ with ‘painted plumes’, and Saturn states that Pandora is a ‘new-found gaud’ 
(2. 1. 64-5; 1. 1. 109). As noted above, Gosson attacks the ‘counterfeit’ nature of players; 
Tuke, similarly, refers to cosmetics as ‘countefeite deuises’.45 Stubbes, meanwhile, uses 
terms that resemble Juno’s condemnation of Pandora when he declares that ‘painted 
faces’ are ‘inticements to vices’, and attacks men who are ‘gallantly painted, or curiously 
plumed in the deceiptfull feathers of pride’.46 In their objections to Pandora as a ‘gaud’ 
with a dangerously provocative ornamental appearance, the planets echo the anxieties 
about prosthesis expressed by the anti-theatrical and anti-cosmetic writers. A reading of 
the play based on this evidence alone could conclude that The Woman in the Moon reflects 
concerns about the place of the ‘construction of the artificial within the origin itself’ that 
Wills identifies as so troubling for early modern English Protestants.47  
 To include a set of discourses in a play, however, is not necessarily to 
endorse that set of discourses. Early modern dramatists often exploit the self-
reflexive nature of their medium in order to critique moralising attacks on 
performance.48 It is in this vein that Lyly presents ‘anti-prosthetic’ voices in The 
Woman in the Moon in order to mock them. This mockery functions as a defence 
of performance, but Lyly also uses it to generate more complex, critical 
approaches to the role of artifice in our understanding of origins. To exemplify 
this point, it is worth returning here in more detail to Nature’s account of her 
theft of the planets’ attributes. Nature tells her new creation:  
Thou art endowed with Saturn’s deep conceit, 
Thy mind as haught as Jupiter’s high thoughts, 
Thy stomach lion-like, like Mars’s heart, 
Thine eyes bright-beamed, like Sol in his array, 
Thy cheeks more fair than are fair Venus’ cheeks, 
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Thy tongue more eloquent than Mercury’s, 
Thy forehead whiter than the silver Moon’s. 
Thus have I robbed the planets for thy sake. 
Besides all this, thou hast proud Juno’s arms, 
Aurora’s hands, and lovely Thetis’ foot. (1. 1. 95-104) 
Lyly structures this list of prosthetic attachments so as to provoke spectators to laughter 
rather than the alarm experienced by the planets. The list descends from lofty references 
to qualities such as ‘Saturn’s deep conceit’ and ‘Jupiter’s high thoughts’ to more prosaic, 
hurried allusions to ‘arms’, ‘hands’ and a ‘foot’. As Leah Scragg notes, following R. 
Warwick Bond, these references to deific body parts are ‘Homeric epiphets’ and provide 
‘indices of outstanding beauty’, but at the same time, this jumbled list parodies the 
Petrarchan motif of the blazon, and so undercuts the aesthetic effect of the dissection of 
heavenly beauty.49 Moreover, Lyly gestures humorously towards the possibility that this 
‘theft’ from the planets is in part a literal theft. Nature specifies that some of Pandora’s 
heavenly adornments, such as her mind, stomach, eyes, tongue and forehead, are 
imitations, ‘like’, or ‘more’ impressive than the heavenly equivalents from which they 
derive. Notably, however, Nature does not specify that she gives Pandora an imitation of 
‘Saturn’s deep conceit’, or that the stolen arms, hands and feet are copies of the originals 
rather than the actual originals. Jupiter’s claim that Pandora is a ‘saint’ that ‘steals’ his 
wife’s ‘arms’ therefore registers as a comically literal complaint, and a parody of anti-
prosthetic outrage, rather than a serious point about the abuse of divine bodies in the 
context of image-making (1. 1. 113).  
 Lyly’s comic attack on the planets contributes to the play’s more extended 
mockery of naïve, literal interpretations of divine corporeality and creation. Lyly’s 
critique of literalism in this context is analogous to Calvinist thought on the means by 
which we imagine and describe God. In particular, The Woman in the Moon can be 
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contextualised with reference to Calvinist deployment of the ‘principle of 
accommodation’, which justifies the use of allusions to corporeality and earthly practices 
in accounts of divinity.50 According to this principle, God, who is beyond 
comprehension, makes himself available to us through ‘a secondary realm of 
signification’, or ‘the signs that we read in the world around us’.51 Examples of 
accommodation include allusions to God as an artisan who uses a ‘mould’, or as a figure 
who has ‘a mouthe, ears, eyes, handes and feete’.52 These allusions work only if we 
understand their limitations, as Calvin explains: 
For what man yea though he be slenderly witted dooth not vnderstande that God 
dooth so with vs speake as it were childishly, as nurses doo with their babes? 
Therefore suche maners of speeche doo not so playnely expresse what God is, as 
they do apply the vnderstandyng of him to our slender capacitie.53   
Here, Calvin clarifies that we must recognise the difference between divinity and the 
language that makes it possible to speak of divinity, which is adapted to our ‘slender’, and 
childlike understanding. In this view, language becomes a kind of prop – a prosthesis – 
that facilitates access to God and thus plays a valuable role in spiritual experience, so 
long as its limitations are understood. Hence, when comparing God to an artisan in 
accounts of the making of spiritual bodies, theologians do not attempt to stretch the 
point too far. In a sermon of 1611, for example, Thomas Draxe addresses the question 
of how God locates and selects the decomposed matter of the bodies of the elect for use 
in the production of their spiritual bodies:   
[a] cunning and skilfull Goldsmith can by his Art and skill single, sunder and 
distinguish, gold, siluer, copper, pewter, brasse and other mettalls, whether in the 
same mountaine mingled, or, accidentally melted and confounded together; and 
some out of one mettall can draw an other: and shall not, and cannot much more 
God almightie, finde out each mans substance, & distinguish it from the dust of 
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beasts, and from the dust of other men, and out of it produce and forme a perfit 
and glorious bodie?54 
Draxe does not use this ‘similitude’ between God and a goldsmith to describe divine 
processes of creation, which are here left highly ambiguous, but rather to indicate that we 
should have faith in divine processes of making that are beyond comprehension.55 
 The Woman in the Moon does not refer directly to this theological discourse, but it 
echoes in Lyly’s mockery of the literalism of the planets’ horrified reactions to Pandora, 
and in the evasiveness of aspects of the play’s depiction of divine creation. The 
dramatist’s portrayal of the making of Pandora is littered with ambiguities that ensure 
that his play cannot be misinterpreted as an idolatrous claim to comprehend divine 
creation. For example, Nature shapes the ‘lifeless image’ that becomes Pandora offstage, 
before the timescale of the play, and so although Nature has a sculptor’s shop and refers 
to sculpting techniques, Lyly’s audience never sees her working in this artisanal fashion 
(1. 1. 57). The precise, practical means by which Nature supplements Pandora’s body 
with divine body parts is also unexplained: Nature merely announces that the 
transmission of these attributes has taken place. This ambiguity adds to the comic tone 
of Nature’s account of her theft of heavenly limbs, but it also mitigates against the 
possibility that spectators might take literally the play’s allusions to divine corporeality. In 
particular, these gaps in the audience’s understanding of Nature’s creative processes 
highlight the limitations of Lyly’s – and his audience’s – knowledge of the making of 
‘natural’ bodies and therefore the relation of those bodies to artifice.  
  Lyly’s careful management of audience members’ knowledge plays an important 
role in the mockery of anti-prosthetic discourse in The Woman in the Moon. While the play 
calls attention to the limitations to spectators’ comprehension of divine creation, those 
spectators occupy a position of knowledge superior to that of the planets. Lyly’s audience 
witness Pandora’s animation, and hear at least vague details about Nature’s creative 
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practices. In contrast, the planets enter the play’s action immediately after Pandora has 
been brought to life, and are not present during Nature’s explanation of the attributes 
with which Pandora is ‘endowed’ (1. 1. 95). Having heard and seen far more about 
Pandora’s creation than the planets, the audience is equipped to spot the significant 
errors in these characters’ responses to the new woman. For example, Saturn declares 
that Pandora is ‘A second man, less perfect than the first’, and therefore assumes that she 
is a secondary version of ‘man’, as is Eve in Genesis (1. 1. 110). Lyly’s audience, however, 
have seen that this creation myth differs significantly from the biblical text, since 
Pandora is made from elemental matter by three female figures, rather than from the 
body of man by a God who is gendered masculine. In a further example, Mars declares 
that Pandora has been ‘made in haste / To rob us planets of our ornaments’ (1. 1. 111-
12). Mars is correct regarding the robbery, but spectators know that Pandora has not 
been ‘made in haste’, having witnessed the carefully stage-managed, ritualistic event of 
her making, facilitated by Nature’s advance preparation of a ‘lifeless image’, because ‘it 
was decreed’ in her ‘deep providence / To make it such as our Utopians crave’ (1. 1. 58-
9). Saturn and Mars’s outraged assessments of Pandora therefore register as erroneous, 
presumptuous claims to understand the works of their maker. 
 The play as a whole, moreover, is structured around the planets’ 
misinterpretation of Nature’s actions. The planets fail to realise that Nature has made 
Pandora to be ‘heaven’s despite’, a phrase that Scragg glosses as ‘object of heavenly 
resentment’ (1. 1. 60).56 When the planets react with anger on first sight of the new 
woman and her stolen attributes, Nature rebukes their ‘foul contempt’, informs them 
that Pandora is ‘framed to darken all your prides’, and asks: 
Ordained not I your motions, and yourselves? 
And dare you check the author of your lives? 
Were not your lights contrived in Nature’s shop? (1. 1. 18-24) 
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Very early in the play, therefore, Lyly emphasises that Nature is the creator of all, 
including the planets, who were ‘contrived’ in the same context as Pandora. When the 
planets respond to the challenge posed by Pandora by asserting influence over the new 
creation so as to cause chaos in Utopia, they merely prove Nature’s original point, that 
they have lost sight of their indebtedness to her as the author of their lives. From this 
perspective, it is not the prosthetic supplementation of Pandora’s body that causes chaos 
in The Woman in the Moon: instead, it is the planets’ idolatrous assumption that they 
understand this prosthetic supplementation. Since the planets’ speeches in this play echo 
the ‘anti-prosthetic’ rhetoric of figures such as Wilson, Gosson, Stubbes and Tuke, it is 
possible to argue that The Woman in the Moon parodies early modern anxieties about the 
corrupting effect of artificial construction on ‘natural’ bodies and consequently earthly 
relations with the divine. In turn, this parody demonstrates to Lyly’s audience the 
limitations of their knowledge of divinity and endorses artifice as the means by which to 
navigate those limitations.  
 Lyly’s endorsement of prosthesis as a performance of beginnings that facilitates 
access to divinity provides a stark counterpoint to Wills’ narrative of Protestant alarm at 
prosthesis as the sign of the failure to return to ‘a form of divine presence that preceded 
figural representation’.57 In addition, Lyly’s defence of prosthesis in The Woman in the 
Moon calls into question the association between this figure and tropes of otherness that 
dominates early modern ‘anti-prosthetic’ writing, and Wills’ influential reading of 
prosthesis. In particular, Lyly’s play disrupts articulations of the referentiality of 
prosthesis in terms of sexual transgression and ‘promiscuity’.58 The trope of prosthesis as 
a figure of sexual incontinence can be understood as an extension of the association 
between ‘the difference involved in heterosexuality’ and ‘fallen image-making’ found in 
strains of Elizabethan iconoclastic thought.59 In this view, the limitations of postlapsarian 
language are the product of original sin. Since Eve was often blamed for the fall, early 
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modern texts frequently figure women as the source of the referential fracture of 
language. Lyly draws on this idea in his depiction of the making of Pandora, as in order 
to give the new woman speech, Nature orders Discord to ‘unloose’ Pandora’s ‘tongue’, 
and states that ‘from that root will many mischiefs grow / If once she spot her state of 
innocence’ (1. 1. 83-6).60 Although The Woman in the Moon is therefore implicated in the 
circulation of these misogynistic discourses, the play nonetheless undercuts the link 
between image-making and sexual difference that underpins the figuring of prosthesis as 
the site of idolatry and adultery.  
 The relevance of sexual difference for our understanding of prosthesis collapses 
in The Woman in the Moon because Lyly repeatedly associates the divine-artificial making 
and supplementation of Pandora with images of sameness. For example, at the beginning 
of the play, Nature claims that the new woman will be ‘like’ the Utopian shepherds, ‘but 
of a purer mould’ (1. 1. 52). This claim indicates that Pandora will be made in the image 
of men, but in such a way as maintains difference to them, and makes her available for 
sexual reproduction. So far, the making of Pandora equates mimesis with sexual 
difference. When Nature turns to her ‘shop’ to complete the creation process, however, 
this equation begins to dissolve. It is worth recalling, for example, that the ‘mould’ which 
Nature uses to make Pandora is ‘matchless … / (Whereof the like was never seen 
before)’ (1. 1. 63-4). The matchless newness of Pandora’s mould contradicts Nature’s 
earlier assertion of the new woman’s similarity to the shepherds, as does her allusion to 
Pandora as ‘a mirror of the earth’ and account of her production from elemental, organic 
matter (1. 1. 60). Furthermore, as noted above, the animation of Pandora with Nature’s 
‘quickening breath’ parallels the making of Adam in Genesis (1. 1. 68). In this way, Lyly 
frames Pandora as an original creation that imitates only the divine. Pandora’s Adam-like 
originality means that she is made without reference to men in the context of the 
playworld. That Nature’s purpose in making Pandora is revealed to be revenge on the 
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planets rather than the provision of a mate for the shepherds further disconnects her 
from sexual difference, as does the fact of her creation by three female characters in the 
absence of the shepherds or any other male figures. Finally, Lyly presents the desire and 
jealousy that Pandora provokes as products of a cosmos that fails to understand the 
nature of its own creation. Lyly’s depiction of the making of Pandora as a prosthetic 
figure thus detaches prosthesis from contexts and concerns shaped by notions of sexual 
difference and transgression.  
 The planets’ failure of understanding in this play can now be described more 
precisely as a refusal to recognise the sameness that they share with Pandora as 
‘contrived’, divine-artificial products (1. 1. 124). This material connection between 
Pandora and the planets is evidenced by the play’s conclusion. Here, Pandora undergoes 
a further prosthetic transformation, as Nature orders that the new woman be ‘placed’ in 
one of the ‘seven’ planets (5. 1. 276). Pandora selects Luna, and so ends the play as the 
woman in the moon. At this point in the play, Lyly draws on the myth of the man in the 
moon, a folk ‘fable’ based on the resemblance between ‘geographical features visible on 
the surface of the moon’, and ‘the figure of a man, bearing a thorn bush on his back, and 
accompanied, in some traditions, by a dog’.61 Pandora is a prosthetic attachment to Luna, 
in that she serves as a replacement for the moon, ruling in the planet’s ‘stead’ so that 
Luna may perform her alternative roles, as ‘Cynthia’, ‘Diana’ and ‘Hecate’ (5. 1. 302-4).62 
Lyly here alters his source material so as to situate prosthesis in a context of sameness, 
reflected by the fact that both characters are female and divine-artificial products of 
Nature. This image of sameness is tainted by misogyny, as Nature expresses the union 
between Pandora and Luna in terms associated in this period with attacks on women’s 
inconstancy: 
Now rule, Pandora, in fair Cynthia’s stead, 
And make the moon inconstant like thyself. 
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Reign thou at women’s nuptials, and their birth; 
Let them be mutable in all their loves, 
Fantastical, childish, and foolish in their desires, 
Demanding toys, 
And stark mad when they cannot have their will. (5. 1. 326-32).63 
Nature here envisages the prosthetic creation of Pandora and her attachment to Luna as 
the source of the corruption of the integrity of future female bodies. We are to an extent 
returned again to a vision of prosthesis as ‘promiscuity’ that, notably, is set to multiply 
across generations of women.64 Although at its conclusion Lyly’s play therefore does not 
entirely refute the terms of ‘anti-prosthetic’ discourse, this final image of Pandora as the 
prosthetic corrupter of corporeal and moral integrity is unstable. It is not clear that 
Pandora alone is the prosthetic source of corruption, since she chooses to join Luna 
because, during the course of the play, the moon ‘made’ her ‘idle, mutable, / Forgetful, 
foolish, fickle, frantic, mad’, and these are ‘the humours that content’ Pandora ‘best’ (5. 
1. 313-15). Pandora’s prosthetic intervention into Luna’s behaviour thus coincides with 
Luna’s earlier, similar interventions into Pandora’s behaviour, which, in turn, are 
prompted by Pandora’s prosthetic construction, which, finally, is designed to remind the 
planets of their own artifice. Lyly once more associates prosthesis with sameness, in this 
instance because the beginning and end of Pandora and Luna’s mutual influence is 
indiscernible except in that both are prosthetic products of Nature.  
 Lyly’s play thus presents an alternative vision of prosthesis to that offered by 
Wilson and Wills on two counts. Firstly, because The Woman in the Moon reveals that the 
performative artificiality of prosthesis is the product of divinity and the only means of 
accessing divinity. Secondly, because this revelation of the divinity of prosthesis entails its 
detachment from tropes of otherness that articulate alarm and anxiety in writings by 
Wilson, Wills and in ‘anti-prosthetic’ discourse. It might, at this point, be reasonable to 
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ask how isolated Lyly’s alternative view of prosthesis is in sixteenth-century thought. 
After all, the playwright has a professional investment in the defence of performance as a 
prosthetic practice. Significantly, a return to definitions of prosthesis as a grammatical 
figure reveals that Lyly’s lack of anxiety about the natural-artificial status of prosthesis is 
not an isolated example.   
 Wilson’s definition for prosthesis is not the earliest reference to this term in the 
English language. The earliest example that I have been able to find is in Sir Thomas 
Elyot’s Latin-English dictionary of 1538. Here, a translation of ‘prosthesis’ is 
accompanied by a brief, practical example of its application: 
Prosthesis, an addicion of a lettre, as gnatus, for natus.65 
As the Dictionary explains elsewhere, ‘natus’ means ‘borne’, and so invokes an original, 
organic moment of coming-into-being antithetical to the artificial ‘addicion’ described by 
the term prosthesis.66 Through this antithesis, Elyot shows that grammatical prosthesis 
performs the starting point of a word, but, in practice, comes into being in the wake of 
that which it precedes. Like Lyly, Elyot therefore interprets prosthetic supplementation 
as an artificial performance of beginnings that is the product of the ‘natural’ origin that it 
necessarily obscures. In turn, just as Lyly finds prosthesis to be a figure of sameness due 
to its divine and ‘natural’ origins, the antithesis between artifice and nature in Elyot’s 
example collapses as nature is revealed to generate prosthetic artifice. Finally, where Lyly 
defends prosthesis through the depiction of female acts of creation, Elyot explains this 
figure with reference to the performance of an action associated with women’s bodies. In 
Wills’ reading of Wilson, the troubling otherness of prosthesis is framed in terms of 
corruption – ‘illicit couplings’ – deriving from sexual difference.67 Lyly’s play and Elyot’s 
Dictionary do not endorse or invite such anxiety about prosthesis as a figure of gendered 
otherness. 
20 
 
Copyright © 2016 Chloe Porter    
 Together, The Woman in the Moon and the Dictionary present a very different view 
of sixteenth-century prosthesis to that proposed by Wills through his heavy reliance on  
The Art of Rhetorique. If Wilson’s allusion to prosthesis articulates an Edwardian 
Protestant dislike of rhetorical ornament, then Elyot and Lyly’s texts, produced at very 
different historical moments, demonstrate the wider availability across the sixteenth 
century of an alternative perspective on prosthesis. Elyot translates ‘prosthesis’ while a 
religious conservative loyal to Henry VIII in the very earliest years of the English 
Reformation.68 His lack of emphasis on the otherness of this figure reflects its inclusion 
as just one of many Latin words translated in a humanist, political text that promotes 
Henrician intellectual culture, ‘Tudor absolutism and English nationalism’.69 Lyly, 
meanwhile, writes at the latter end of the century and the reign of Elizabeth I, in a 
manner that, as I have argued, echoes a Calvinist worldview.70 These examples are 
products of specific historical contexts, and we cannot interpret Elyot and Lyly’s 
‘alternative’ attitude to prosthesis as an ahistorical, politically progressive rejection of 
markers of difference. The narrative of early modern prosthesis that these different texts 
present, however, encourages us to reconfigure the terms of our twenty-first century 
discourse on prosthesis. 
 In particular, this early modern evidence urges a rethinking of the place of 
notions of difference and otherness in critical work in this area. For example, in a more 
recent work on technology and the body, Wills argues ‘for the origin as prosthetic’.71 Lyly 
and Elyot’s allusions to prosthetic yet ‘natural’ origins to an extent accord with this view, 
but the sixteenth-century writers’ lack of anxiety about the place of artificiality in 
accounts of origins differs from the critical position adopted by Wills. In his argument, 
Wills builds on a literal reading of Freud’s account of ‘the dwelling house’ as a ‘substitute 
for the mother’s womb’, in which there is ‘no structural distinction … between 
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prosthetic supplements to the human and natural occurrences of the human’.72 Wills 
couples this Freudian evidence with a telling allusion to the making of Pandora: 
When it comes to woman, at least the Pandora fashioned by Hephaestus, the 
mother of us all and the bearer of our womb-home is explicitly understood as … 
artistic production or technological artifice … however human we become, we 
do not for all that shake off the mythological heritage of artificial creation … The 
home back behind us all is an artificial construct.73  
As Wills reads the Pandora myth through Freud, the artifice of the creation of woman 
becomes a site of anxiety which ‘we’ will wish to ‘shake off’, and reject. Watching Lyly’s 
treatment of the same myth in The Woman in the Moon in the late sixteenth century, 
Elizabethan audiences were encouraged to embrace this sense of artifice as the only 
means by which to understand origins. In a twenty-first century Freudian framework, in 
contrast, Wills’ prosthesis remains a figure of specifically sexual anxiety, expressed in a 
parallel between the intermingling of the ‘natural into the unnatural’ signalled by artificial 
origins, and ‘the supposedly monstrous perversions of natural relations that are 
infanticide, incest, and parricide’.74 A Freudian reading of The Woman in the Moon or 
Elyot’s definition for prosthesis may well elicit similar conclusions. By looking at these 
texts in historical context, however, it is possible to discern the erosion of connections 
between prosthesis, sexual transgression, and fearfully provocative, ornamental female 
appearances. This erosion demonstrates that sixteenth-century contexts do not always 
invite us to emphasise otherness in our approaches to prosthesis. Instead, historical 
studies can offer ways of seeing prosthesis that loosen the frameworks of difference 
through which we understand this figure. 
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